Thursday, 14 April 2022

The Moralist

Gaius Cilnius Maecenas to (the historian) Livy: '...I detect the odor of a moralist. And it seems to me that the moralist is the most useless and contemptible of creatures. He is useless in that he would expend his energies upon making judgments rather than upon gaining knowledge, for the reason that judgment is easy and knowledge is difficult. He is contemptible in that his judgments reflect a vision of himself which in his ignorance and pride he would impose upon the world. I implore you, do not become a moralist; you will destroy your art and your mind.'
Is he, Maecenas, right? And to what extent was this Maecenas' opinion and to what extend John Williams', the author?
I have just put to myself an essay question which I have no intention of outlining an answer to, though in essence what Maecenas or Williams' says I hold to be true, for if that was a Roman view of moralists then it's all the more truer of the general populace today, especially in a world where, knowledge, although everywhere, and accessible, it is even harder to discern the grains of fact and the grains of fiction. Therefore, in a state of either confusion or indifference, with our position in the argument already fixed upon, we impart our judgement to whoever will listen or give us a platform – and there are many platforms to choose from. If we hold this view of moralists to be true then it destroys so much more than just the moralist's own mind or that which they might touch through their work, it corrupts the very notion of liberty; it destroys society, for it does not promote what it says is its aim, that of tolerance.
It is too easy to allow that knowledge is difficult, and that judgement without (knowledge), except that of your preconceptions, is acceptable. We determine that this premise should not shape the world, and yet it is, it does.
And yet in other spheres, say that of the soldier, we talk of duty. They are, in other words, not paid to think or judge. They are told what they are told and instructed, as a body, what is required of them. They can, of course, have their opinion but duty comes first, which may entail acting against any knowledge gained or judgement formed. 'It is not', in the words of a Roman Centurion, 'the place of the soldier to think of politics, and it is not the business of the soldier to hate or love. It is his duty to fulfil his oath.' Yes; even if that means fighting against his own principles, or own countrymen. In the military there is no voice for moralists; only when released (from service) can the solider speak and explain or defend their past actions.
Moralists cannot understand how the moral ground can be put so easily aside, and yet as humans we make that judgement all the time, based on what we think we know and how morally comfortable we are with taking certain steps. It is far easier for a moralist to look back on another's decision to act – either in word or deed – because they weren't and haven't been in that position. They can only question what others did, and presume what they, in the same age or instant, would have done, which is obviously advantageous to taking the higher moral ground, when in reality they are not in possession of the full facts or of the experience as it was experienced and do not know how they would have responded if they had been.
To paraphrase Maecenas: judgement is easy, knowledge difficult.

Picture credit: Horatius Reads Before Maecenas, 1863, Fyodor Bronnikov (source: WikiArt)

Quotes from Augustus by John Williams.

Adapted from a journal entry, written April 2021.